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NATO emerged from its 19-20 November 
2010 Lisbon Summit with a new Strategic 
Concept (SC) that is concise and readable. 
That is an achievement in its own right, as 
those who in preparing for the Summit 
struggled through the previous long-
winding 1999 version will appreciate. The 
new text does not break a daring new path 
for NATO nor does it bridge any age-old 
divide, which perhaps explains why 
attention from the media and the general 
public outlasted the Summit itself by just a 
day or two. Even so the Summit can be 
deemed successful, for NATO needed a 
new and clear mission statement, as the 
public, and many governments, were 
growing restive about Afghanistan, and 
were beginning to doubt whether that 
seemingly never-ending war did not put a 
mortgage on the Alliance’s reason for 
living: the collective defence of its territory. 
The new Strategic Concept provides the 
answers that were to be expected. Of 
course, NATO must be capable of both 
Article 5, i.e. territorial defence, and non-
Article 5, i.e. worldwide crisis management 
operations. Evidently, the Alliance must 
remain committed to nuclear disarmament 
while maintaining nuclear deterrence as a 
core element of Article 5: “As long as 
nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain 
a nuclear Alliance” (SC §17). Naturally, it is 
better to have a “strong and constructive 
partnership with Russia” (SC §34) than to 
steer an antagonistic course — Russia’s 
own interpretation of that will become 
clear soon enough. The Strategic Concept 
offers a neat expression of NATO’s 
mission and how it seeks to go about it in 
the years to come. 
And yet, a forceful Strategic Concept has 
not generated a self-confident Alliance, and 
not just because at the same time as 
strategizing NATO had to down-size as 
well. The NATO structure will be cut from 
some 13,000 to some 8,000 personnel. The 
much more fundamental reason for the 
existential unease that marks NATO today 
is its loss of centrality. The Strategic 
Concept contains a number of ambiguities 
as a consequence of trying to reconcile two 
ways of dealing with this loss of centrality: 
staying relevant by strengthening the core 
business, or staying relevant by adding new 
business lines. 
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THE POLITICAL CENTRE OF GRAVITY 
HAS SHIFTED 
 
As long as the Cold War lasted, it was 
logical for defence against the vital military 
threat to the territorial integrity of the 
Allies to be high on the political agenda, 
hence the centrality of NATO in the 
multilateral relations of Europe and North 
America. Now that there no longer is a 
vital threat, it is equally logical for 
territorial defence and the Alliance that 
organizes it to lose that central position, as 
other issues rise to the top of the agenda: 
climate change, energy scarcity, global 
economic and financial governance, the 
role of the emerging powers. These are not 
threats, entailing an immediate risk of 
violence, but challenges. They cannot be 
tackled by military means, but require a 
mix of diplomatic, economic, technological 
and other instruments. In short, this is 
foreign policy — not defence. 
The gradual shift of the political centre of 
gravity away from NATO should not be 
resisted. While unpleasant perhaps for 
NATO, it is in fact a luxury problem: there 
are no more vital threats to our territory, 
hence we can afford to prioritize other 
issues. NATO is not equipped to deal with 
those — NATO cannot do foreign policy. 
Trying to keep NATO relevant by 
artificially forcing all of these issues onto 
its agenda is counter-productive, for as the 
Alliance will not be able to solve them it 
only risks being discredited without hope 
of achieving success. At the same time, 
means and efforts will be distracted from 
its core business of territorial defence and 
crisis management, which does in fact 
ensure NATO’s relevance — only in a less 
central position that before. 
That does not mean that NATO cannot 
discuss climate change or energy scarcity, 
but only in so far as they have implications 
for security and defence. Nor does it imply 
that NATO should not have a dialogue 
with third States. Obviously, all those that 
deploy forces on operations are entitled to 
“a structural role in shaping strategy and 
decisions on NATO-led missions to which 
they contribute”. Perhaps NATO might 
even “develop political dialogue and 
practical cooperation with any nations and 
relevant organizations across the globe that 
share our interest in peaceful international 
relations” (SC §30). As long, that is, as 
NATO realizes that it cannot be the main 
forum through which Europeans and 
Americans channel their relations with 
States such as China, India, or Brazil, or 
even Russia. 
The simple reason is best expressed by one 
of NATO’s own buzzwords: the 
comprehensive approach. NATO is a 
politico-military organization, which deals 
with one dimension of foreign policy only, 
i.e. security and defence. Responses to 
global challenges and relations with third 
States require a much broader, 
comprehensive approach that encompasses 
all of foreign policy, from aid and trade to 
diplomacy and the military. While NATO 
can contribute, it is not equipped to take 
the lead. That is up to the governments of 
its members, including notably the United 
States and those members and non-
members that happen to have organized 
themselves into the European Union. The 
US and the EU: those are the true, 
comprehensive foreign policy actors in 
Europe and North America. The EU’s 
foreign policy institutions were greatly 
strengthened by the Lisbon Treaty, which 
entered into force on 1 December 2009, 
and in Lisbon, back-to-back with the 
NATO Summit, the EU’s new President of 
the European Council met with the 
President of the US for bilateral talks. In 
an age where, fortunately, foreign policy 
challenges outweigh direct security threats, 
the EU and the US, and direct consultation 
between them, logically take centre stage. 
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FOCUSING ON THE “HARD” CORE 
BUSINESS 
 
NATO must continue to play a leading 
role, by contrast, in what constitutes its 
core business: “hard security”, both 
defence against threats to our territory and 
global military crisis management. Here lies 
the strength and the continued relevance 
of the Alliance. 
If today there are no more vital threats to 
Alliance territory, it cannot be excluded 
that in the long term NATO will again see 
a major threat arise, or may have to ward 
off the consequences of inter-State war 
between other powers. To that end, Article 
5 functions as the ultimate insurance. The 
call, particularly from East European 
Allies, to reconfirm Article 5 is 
understandable and legitimate, hence the 
firm statement: “NATO members will 
always assist each other against attack” (SC 
§4). The credibility of this commitment is 
not helped by those who seek to expand 
the scope of Article 5, however. What does 
the reference to “emerging security 
challenges” (SC §4) mean?  The North 
Atlantic Treaty is clear: “an armed attack 
against one or more […] shall be 
considered an attack against them all”. 
Once one starts to add other types of 
contingencies than armed attack, such as 
energy or cyber security, a grey zone 
quickly emerges, making it more difficult 
to decide what constitutes sufficient 
ground to invoke Article 5. For how long 
must the gas be cut e.g. — a day, a week, a 
month? How to react to cyber attacks 
perpetrated by fluid collectives of 
individuals, some of them under-age? 
Once more, the Alliance will not be kept 
relevant by trying to imagine military 
responses to non-military challenges: 
energy security, cyber security, even 
terrorism are best tackled by a holistic 
foreign and security policy, including 
notably the police and justice dimension, in 
the framework of which the military 
instrument is but a last resort. 
In the absence of a vital threat, it can be 
doubted too whether missile defence of all 
Alliance territory constitutes an 
indispensable and effective contribution to 
collective defence. The actual threat of 
missile attack seems limited and certainly 
not markedly higher than other types of 
threat that cannot be stopped by missile 
defence, notably terrorism, currently the 
only direct threat of violence against our 
citizens on Alliance territory. Would not 
the combination of deterrence and a 
proactive foreign policy in cooperation 
with other powers suffice to contain, and 
ideally come to a mutual agreement with 
those States that acquire a significant 
missile capacity? As it is, the effectiveness 
of missile defence technology to protect 
our entire territory remains very much in 
doubt, while the financial burden will 
certainly be very heavy. At the moment 
though, that will mostly be carried by the 
US, which will contribute the actual missile 
defence capability, while the other Allies 
will fund the required command & control 
system for an amount in excess of €700 
million over 10 years (including €200 
million added in Lisbon to expand 
protection from troops deployed in theatre 
to Allied territory itself). Their contribution 
will hopefully remain at this level, for in 
the wake of the financial crisis European 
Allies would better focus their reduced 
defence budgets on generating deployable 
capabilities for crisis management. 
If after Afghanistan the appetite to 
undertake new large-scale operations has 
surely diminished, Europe and North 
America will continue to have to engage in 
crisis management. For there will be crises 
in which vital interests are at stake, such as 
“the vital communication, transport and 
transit routes on which international trade, 
energy security and prosperity depend” (SC 
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§13). Furthermore, there will sadly be 
instances of crimes against which Europe 
and North America have a “Responsibility 
to Protect” populations in the context of 
the collective security system of the United 
Nations. Crisis management beyond the 
North Atlantic area thus also forms part of 
NATO’s core business. 
However, through which organization 
Europeans and Americans will act in which 
case cannot be decided beforehand: 
NATO, the EU’s Common Security and 
Defence Policy (CSDP), the UN — the 
most suitable framework for military 
deployment will have to be selected on a 
case-by-case basis. On occasions when 
Europeans and Americans both want to 
engage, it will be NATO. But on other 
occasions, Americans might have other 
priorities than Europeans, or might already 
be engaged elsewhere, or for political 
reasons NATO might be less welcome in a 
region. Alternatives are thus required, if we 
want to be able to act in every contingency 
and deploy forces in the quickest and safest 
manner. The CSDP framework too 
therefore must be completely operational, 
including a permanent command & control 
structure that allows for permanently 
ongoing contingency planning, a smooth 
planning process in crisis situations, and 
the conduct of all types of crisis 
management operations, including combat 
missions if necessary. As the NATO 
command & control structure is being 
downsized by no less than 5,000 staff, 
nations would certainly be able to find the 
300 or so officers that would have to be 
seconded to the EU to that end. At the 
same time, a permanent EU capacity would 
be a lot cheaper for those three EU 
Member States that now always have to 
multinationalize their national headquarters 
to run CSDP operations: France, Germany 
and the UK. 
In crisis management too, the primacy of 
foreign policy is uncontested. The military 
end-state aimed at by an operation is never 
an end in itself, but a step towards a 
comprehensive political end-state. That is 
decided upon by the foreign policy actors: 
the governments and, when the European 
governments concert (which ought always 
to be the case), the EU. Regardless of the 
framework in which European troops are 
deployed — NATO, CSDP or the UN — 
Europeans discuss the wider foreign policy 
objectives in the EU framework. That is 
the case for Lebanon e.g., in the 
framework of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy, even though the 
8,000 European soldiers are there as Blue 
Helmets, under UN command. It is the 
case for Kosovo, where European military 
are deployed under the NATO-flag. And it 
ought to be the case much more for 
Afghanistan, if Europeans want to have an 
impact on strategy towards the country and 
the region. 
Crisis management requires capabilities. At 
the Summit NATO adopted the Lisbon 
Capability Package, fixing the funding for a 
number of multinational projects. The 
boots on the ground however have to be 
provided by the nations. European Allies 
are still struggling to improve the efficiency 
of their defence effort: their combined 
defence budgets ought to generate much 
more deployable capabilities. But they do 
not, because in reality they are not 
combined — the problem of European 
defence is fragmentation. The answer is 
integration: a combination of 
specialization, pooling of efforts, and doing 
away with redundant assets. The answer, 
furthermore, is Europe: such integration 
has to, and can only, take place among 
Europeans — the US has no need to pool 
its military. Hence CSDP is the platform 
from which to launch a stepped up 
European defence effort. On 9 December 
2010, the Ministers of Defence of the EU 
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agreed on the so-called Ghent Framework, 
referring to their earlier informal meeting 
in that city in September. Each EU 
Member State will analyze its capabilities in 
order to identify: (1) those it will maintain 
on a national level; (2) those to which it 
will contribute through pooling with other 
Member States; and (3) those to which it 
will no longer contribute, relying on 
specialization and role-sharing between 
Member States. If done in a permanent 
and structured manner, such a process will 
lead to true cooperation — as envisaged by 
Permanent Structured Cooperation, the 
new defence mechanism in the Lisbon 
Treaty. The end-result will benefit 
everybody: more effective forces, no 
matter how integrated, will be available for 
national as well as CSDP, NATO and UN 
operations. 
AVOID “SOFT” BRANCHING-OUT 
 
Crisis management is not exclusively 
military. In Lisbon, NATO decided to 
create “an appropriate but modest civilian 
crisis management capability” in order “to 
interface more effectively with civilian 
partners”, but it “may also be used to plan, 
employ and coordinate civilian activities 
until conditions allow for the transfer of 
those responsibilities and tasks to other 
actors” (SC §25). Undoubtedly, the 
“interface” is highly necessary. An 
arrangement is needed that, whenever 
NATO is chosen as the framework for a 
military operation, allows from the very 
start for the involvement in NATO 
planning of whichever actor will take 
charge of the political, social and economic 
tasks, be it the EU or the UN. These can 
then implement those tasks in full 
coordination with the military — but under 
their own command. Once more, the 
primacy of foreign policy must be 
recognized. The highest political authority, 
which will set the comprehensive foreign 
policy strategy towards the country 
concerned, will always lie outside NATO, 
with the US and the EU, and finally with 
the UN. It is not up to NATO to 
command the various civilian dimensions 
of this comprehensive strategy. 
The added value of creating a NATO 
capacity to “plan, employ and coordinate” 
civilian tasks is doubtful therefore. Certain 
civilian tasks will in any case have to be 
implemented from the start, 
simultaneously with military operations. 
That civilian capacity will in any case have 
to be provided by nations (e.g. police, 
gendarmerie, civil protection), by other 
international organizations (notably various 
UN agencies), and by NGOs, and will in 
any case require military protection. 
Building a NATO “civilian HQ” would 
duplicate existing civilian command & 
control structures, notably the EU’s 
Civilian Planning and Conduct Capacity 
(CPCC), without adding more capability. 
More importantly, this would be a useless 
duplication, for even if initially NATO 
itself would conduct some civilian tasks, 
eventually the other actors will always need 
to come in — certainly the Alliance will 
not create a development policy, a trade 
policy etc. Better then to leave the short 
term (i.e. civilian crisis management stricto 
sensu) and the long-term civilian dimension 
in the same hands. Nor would it be very 
useful then to “identify and train civilian 
specialists from member states” (SC §25). 
There already exists a plethora of national, 
EU and UN courses for civilian crisis 
management. The problem is not how to 
train policemen, judges etc. for deployment 
abroad — the issue is where to find them.  
CONCLUSION 
 
NATO remains the forum where Europe 
and North America organize their 
collective defence, and it remains one of 
the key actors through which they do crisis 
management and cooperative security. 
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Those are the three “essential core tasks” 
defined by the new Strategic Concept (§4). 
The more capable NATO will be of 
implementing those security and defence 
tasks, the more relevant it will be. Attempts 
to broaden NATO’s agenda beyond those 
core tasks and move into civilian crisis 
management and even into foreign policy 
cannot achieve success, for the Alliance is 
an alliance, not a foreign policy actor. 
Instead, such distractions will only serve to 
undermine the core tasks and thus to 
question NATO’s relevance. What this 
artificial broadening of the agenda will not 
do is bring back the centrality that NATO 
enjoyed during the Cold War. Fortunately, 
for to put it simply, that today the agenda 
of Europe and North America is no longer 
dominated by a vital threat to their 
territory is a good thing. 
NATO’s loss of centrality does not affect 
the transatlantic relationship, however, for 
we should not make the mistake of 
equating transatlantic relations with NATO 
only. Logically, if defence is no longer the 
main concern, the main debate moves 
elsewhere, particularly to the direct EU-US 
relationship. That transatlantic link, 
between the two fully-fledged foreign 
policy actors, needs to be deepened and 
operationalized. Within such a 
fundamental political partnership, NATO 
remains a key asset, the executive 
organization that Europeans and 
Americans use when they need to act 
together in the military field. Let us hope 
that an effective foreign policy can limit 
those occasions as much as possible. 
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